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ANTITRUST-ITT v. GTE-The Ninth Circuit
Refuses to Extend the Divestiture Remedy to Private
Litigants Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act.
INTRODUCTION
On April 25, 1975 the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held in International Telephone and Telegraph
Corp. v. General Telephone and Electronics Corp.' (ITT) that the
remedy of divestiture was not available to the private litigant suing
under section 162 of the Clayton Act for a violation of section 73 of
the Act.4 In so holding the Ninth Circuit reversed a lower court
decision which had found that "[iun the absence of solid precedent
or legislature history"' divestiture' was an available remedy within
the equity concept underlying section 16, and that it was within the
court's traditionally wide latitude to fashion such an appropriate
equitable remedy.
The controversy over the availability of divestiture as a remedy
in a privately litigated suit under section 16 of the Clayton Act is
not a new one, and several commentators7 have discussed the issue
in varying degrees and depths. The issue has, however, been given
new life as recent judicial decisions have taken divergent views on
the availability of the divestiture remedy in private suits. These
1. 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
4. 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975).
5. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone and Electronic
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1207 (D. Hawaii 1972).
6. Divestiture had been discussed in the following manner:
Although distinctions may be made between the remedies of dissolution, divorce-
ment, and divestiture, the term divestiture is broad enough to cover the other two.
Divestiture refers to divesting a defendant of property, securities, or other assets;
divorcement applies to the effect of a decree ordering particular types of divestiture
and is generally especially applicable to vertically integrated organizations; dissolu-
tion refers to any situation where the dissolving of an illegal combination is in-
volved, including the dissolution of such combinations by divestiture and divorce-
ment.
Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation as a Remedy for Violation of Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 49 MINN. L. REV. 267, 270 n.21 (1964) (citing S. OPPENHEIM, CASES ON
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 885 (1948), and Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The
Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 INn. L.J. 1 (1951)),
7. See, Comment, Private Divestiture: Antitrust's Latest Problem Child, 41 FORDHAM L.
REV. 569 (1973); Note, The Use of Divestiture In Private Antitrust Suits, 43 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 261 (1974); Peacock, Private Divestiture Suits Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 48
TEX. L. REV. 94 (1969); Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation as a Remedy
for Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 49 MINN. L. REV. 267 (1964).
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cases have created a schism in the law by holding that divestiture,
a preferred and traditionally appropriate remedy in government
instituted antitrust litigation, is unavailable when such suits are
instituted by private parties.
This article will examine the ITT case in light of the pertinent
statutory provisions of the Clayton Act and the legislative history
of the Act. It is submitted that divestiture is an appropriate and
effective remedy in antitrust litigation regardless of the private or
public character of the party initiating the law suit. No valid reason
exists to preclude the use of this remedy in privately instituted
litigation.
ANTIMERGER POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT
Distaste for monopoly is one of the more pervasive American sen-
timents. It consists of an essentially permanent belief that competi-
tion breeds efficient allocation of resources. No one would deny that
Congress passed antimerger sections I and 21 of the Sherman Act
and section 710 of the Clayton Act in response to genuine public
distrust of monopolies." Donald F. Turner, former head of the Jus-
tice Department Antitrust Division, in discussing the policy consid-
erations underlying the antimerger sections stated:
The principle purpose of the antimerger law is to forestall the
creation of, or an increase in, market power. Its purpose is to pre-
serve competitively structured markets insofar as natural forces
will permit. . . . If we can avoid the creation of undue market
power, by and large we expect to achieve better market perfor-
mance-better in terms of lower prices, higher quality products,
and innovations both in product and technology. We also expect
to minimize the misallocation of resources that results from
monoply or oligopoly pricing. . .The economic purpose behind an
antimerger policy is precisely the same as the purpose behind the
antitrust prohibition on such anti-competitive agreements as
price-fixing. The purpose is to prevent, wherever natural economic
forces do not compel it, the development of the kind of concen-
trated market structure that produces the same adverse affects on
performance as those produced by price fixing and similar agree-
ments. 2
The effectiveness of this policy must necessarily depend upon the
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1(1970).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
11. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
12. Donald F. Turner, Address Before Fifth Conference of the National Industrial
Conference Board, March 3, 1966.
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remedies available once a violation of antimerger law has been es-
tablished.'3 Various remedies, including criminal penalties, money
damages and equitable relief exist for application by and within the
discretion of the trial court.
The primary antitrust enforcement responsibility lies with the
Government. 4 In detecting violations of the antitrust laws, govern-
ment enforcement agencies rely heavily upon a complaint procedure
whereby the public may file claims alleging injury or threats of
restrained trade. Private antitrust actions were intended to provide
a remedy to an injured private party and to supplement the enforce-
ment efforts of the Government.'5 Due to the limited manpower and
financial resources of the government enforcement branches, 6 this
supplemental enforcement function provided by private antitrust
suits becomes increasingly important.
It is an economic reality that limited resources will inevitably
limit the Government's action to those cases where it believes it can
be most successful and have the greatest deterrent effect. When the
Government brings an action against a corporation for a violation
of the antitrust laws, it must examine its case in view of these
economic limitations.
Once the Government establishes a violation of the antitrust laws
injunctive relief in addition to other remedies, is available. Section
15 of the Clayton Act'7 provides the basis for injunctive relief in
government antitrust actions. That section has consistently been
interpreted as authorizing the remedy of divestiture.'8 In fact, sec-
13. As Mr. Justice Jackson stated in a government suit referring to the situation in which
a plaintiff sustained the burden of proving the antitrust violation but subsequently received
an inadequate remedy, he has "won a suit and lost a cause." International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970).
15. The Supreme Court emphasized this aspect of the private suit with the following, and
in addition stated how section 16 should be viewed:
[Tihe purpose of giving private parties treble damage and injunctive remedies was
not merely to provide private relief, but was to serve as well the high purpose of
enforcing the antitrust laws . . . Section 16 should be construed and applied with
this purpose in mind, and with the knowledge that the remedy it affords
[injunctive relief], like other equitable remedies, is flexible and capable of nice
adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well
as between competing private claims. . . . Its availability should be "conditioned
by the necessities of the public interest which Congress has sought to protect."
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), providing in pertinent part:
No corporations . . . shall acquire . . . the whole or any part of the stock or other
share capital . . . of another corporation . . . where in any line of commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970).
18. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
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tion 15 was considered merely a recapitulation of section 4 of the
Sherman Act.19 While neither provision expressly grants a remedy
of divestiture to the Government, section 4 of the Sherman Act had
been interpreted by the Supreme Court as authorizing such reme-
dial measures as the courts deemed necessary to effectuate the anti-
trust policy.20
The Divestiture Remedy In General
The Supreme Court in the leading case of Standard Oil Co. v.
United States2 indicated two criteria to be followed by the courts
in future applications of the. Sherman Act, and stated to what end
a prescribed remedy should be addressed:
1st. To forbid the doing in the future of acts like those which we
have found to have been done in the past which would be violative
of the statute. 2d. The exertion of such measure of relief as will
effectually dissolve the combination found to exist in violation of
the statute, and thus neutralize the extension and continually op-
erating force which the possession of the power unlawfully ob-
tained has brought and will continue to bring about.12
The Standard Oil Court utilized section 4 of the Sherman Act as the
basis for granting the Government such remedies as would "effec-
tually dissolve the combination." In United States v. American
Tobacco Co. ,23 the Supreme Court employed the same Sherman Act
provision to establish divestiture as a remedy in an antitrust suit.
Since Congress was aware of the Court's interpretation that
divestiture was an available remedy to the Government under sec-
tion 4 of the Sherman Act, had it intended to preclude that interpre-
tation of section 15 of the Clayton Act it could easily have done So. 24
Furthermore, considering the Clayton Act was primarily enacted
because of inadequacies of the Sherman Act, Congress certainly
drafted and discussed remedial measures of the Clayton Act with
an eye toward the deficiencies and misapplications of the Sherman
Act provisions.
Perhaps, the most significant decision utilizing divestiture as a
19. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
20. The court had effected divestiture remedies in two major decisions under the Sherman
Act prior to the 1914 enactment of the Clayton Act. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
21. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
22. Id. at 78.
23. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
24. See Comment, Private Divestiture: Antitrust's Latest Problem Child, 41 FORDHAM L.
REV. 569, 583 (1973).
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remedy is United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.25 The
duPont case had the effect of making divestiture more a rule than
an exception in government instituted cases under section 7 of the
Clayton Act. That controversy involved significant stock holdings2"
by the duPont Corporation of the stock of General Motors Corpora-
tion. The government suit claimed violations of sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act. While the lower
court in effect ordered a partial divestiture of stock rights,2 7 the
Supreme Court found this solution inadequate and ordered duPont
to completely divest itself of its General Motors stock holdings:
It cannot be gainsaid that complete divestiture is peculiarly appro-
priate in cases of stock acquisitions which violates § 7. That stat-
ute is specific and "narrowly directed," . . . and it outlaws a par-
ticular form of economic control-stock acquisitions which tend to
create a monoply of any line of commerce. The very words of § 7
suggest that an undoing of the acquisition is a natural remedy.
Divestiture or dissolution has traditionally been the remedy for
Sherman Act violations whose heart is intercorporate combination
and control, and it is reasonable to think immediately of the same
remedy when section 7 of the Clayton Act, which particularizes the
Sherman Act standard of illegality, is involved. Of the very few
litigated § 7 cases which have been reported, most decreed divesti-
ture as a matter of course. Divestiture has been called the most
important of antitrust remedies. It is simple, relatively easy to
administer, and sure. It should always be in the forefront of a
court's mind when a violation of § 7 has been found."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court indicated that the lower court
had overemphasized the hardship such a remedy would have on
private interests. In analyzing the appropriateness of divestiture in
future litigation, the Court stated, in effect that the test of the
appropriateness of a remedy is whether it affords the necessary relief
for the public interest, not the amount of hardship it might work
on private interest. The Court considered divestiture the most dras-
tic, but also the most effective antitrust remedy available.29
Thus, the Supreme Court left no question regarding the availabil-
25. 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
26. The duPont holdings amounted to approximately 63,000,000 shares or 23 percent of
the total outstanding General Motors Corporation common stock. Id.
27. The lower court removed the right to vote the stock from the duPont Company and
effected an order placing the voting rights with the duPont shareholders. United States v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1959), modified, 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
28. 366 U.S. at 328-31 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 326-27.
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ity of divestiture in an antitrust suit, particularly when considering
an illegal merger or acquisition in violation of section 7.30 It appears
significant that the Court did not speak in terms of the availability
of divestiture only in government suits. Rather, the Court empha-
sized the adequacy of the relief once a section 7 violation was proven
regardless of the public or private nature of the party initiating the
suit.
The Private Litigant And The Divestiture Remedy
Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to
sue for and have injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss or
damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . when and under
the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against
threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by
courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings...11
In short, section 16 provides an injunctive remedy, with no attrac-
tive provisions beyond actual damage.2 It envisions remedying po-
tential harm rather than actual harm.3
There has been an increasing use of section 16 3 by private parties
30. Another commentator has stated in reference to the significance of the duPont case:
Thus, in duPont, the Court made divestiture the preferred remedy for violation of
the merger laws and since that case, divestiture has been much more frequently
ordered. DuPont, therefore, had the effect of removing much of the judicial re-
straint surrounding the use of divestiture, and placing it in the forefront of antitrust
remedies.
Comment, Private Divestiture: Antitrust's Latest Problem Child, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 569,
587 (1973).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
32. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
modified on other grounds, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971) rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363
(1973) ($137 million damage award after trebling).
33. The Clayton Act contains two statutory provisions which govern the maintenance of
private actions and the relief granted therein once a violation has been established. Section
4 of the Act provides the more familiar remedy of treble damages, stating: "Any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue .. , and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit..." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The possibility of recovering, under section 4, not only the
proven damages but also the additional award trebling those damages would appear to be a
particularly attractive inducement for a private party to bring an antitrust action. Encour-
agement of potentially successful litigation was, according to the Supreme Court, precisely
the purpose underlying section 4 of the Clayton Act. The Court has reasoned that such private
litigation would aid in implementing the overriding public policy in favor of competition, thus
adding considerable enforcement power and serving as a prominent deterrent to antitrust
violations.
34. During the period 1960-1972, 7,436 private antitrust actions were filed with almost
1300 of those suits being filed in 1972 alone. The 1972 volume more than trebled the number
filed in 1960 and was an increase of approximately 30 percent over those filed in 1971. 1972
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, ANN. REP. A-15.
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attempting to enjoin takeover bids or acquisitions in violation of
section 7 of the Clayton Act." However, until recently,36 divestiture
had never been directly ordered in a suit brought by a private plain-
tiff. The availability of a divestiture remedy has seldom been ques-
tioned37 under either section 4 of the Sherman Act 38 or under section
15 3 of the Clayton Act. But the courts' treatment of the question of
the availability of divestiture under section 16 of the Clayton Act
has been less definite.
Traditionally the rationale underlying denial of divestiture in sec-
tion 16 suits has been traced to two primary sources.40 In
Continental Securities Co. v. Michigan Central R. Co.," the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals denied a private litigant's request for a
divestiture order:
The main remedy sought is dissolution of the combination. Section
16 never has been held to reach such a case. The result sought is
practically the same as would be asked for in a suit by the Attorney
General.2
The apparent conclusion of the court was that the Government, but
not private litigants, may obtain a divestiture order . 3 However, the
court failed to discuss this conclusion and presented no rationale for
this dichotomy of remedies." Nevertheless, many courts, even if not
expressly citing Continental Securities, have followed dictum in
that opinion.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
36. See, e.g., International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone and
Electronics Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 518 F.2d
913 (9th Cir. 1975); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606 (C.D.
Calif. 1972); NBO Industries Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 5 TRADE REG.
REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) 60, 479 (3d Cir. 1975).
37. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S.
316 (1961).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970).
40. See generally Peacock, Private Divestiture Suits Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act,
48 TEx. L. REv. 54 (1969); Note, The Use of Divestiture In Private Antitrust Suits, 43 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 261 (1974); Comment, Private Divestiture: Antitrust's Latest Problem Child,
41 FORDHAM L. REv. 569 (1973).
41. 16 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 741 (1927).
42. Id. at 379.
43. See Note, The Use of Divestiture In Private Antitrust Suits, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
261 (1974).
44. In 1904 the government obtained what was in effect a divestiture order. See Northern
Securities v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 355 (1904).
45. See, e.g., Westor Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 757, 763
(D.N.J. 1941); Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 532, 542
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
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Courts, additionally, have found a second rationale for denial of
such a remedy in the legislative history of the Clayton Act.4" The
most often quoted passages of the legislative record involve state-
ments made during the committee hearings by a member of the
committee, and one witness-Louis D. Brandeis.47 These statements
were made in opposition to a provision providing for private dissolu-
tion remedy. General Telephone and Electronics argued in the dis-
trict court that these statements were probative of Congress' inten-
tion to preclude divestiture as a remedy to the private litigant. The
district court refused to accept the argument. It opined that these
statements were not indicative of congressional intent and viewed
them as little more than inquiry and discussion during the debates
of the legislative process.48
Thus, the traditional rationale for denial of a private divestiture
remedy would appear to be on less than solid ground. The case law
relies, in part, on dicta from the 1926 Continental Securities case,
while the legislative history is supported, not by committee reports,
but by colloquies made in committee hearings. Regardless, courts
continue to examine the issue of availability of divestiture in a
privately litigated suit in light of one or both of these rationales. The
Ninth Circuit in the ITT case was no exception.
THE ITT CASE HISTORY
In October of 1967, International Telephone and Telegraph Cor-
poration (ITT) brought an action under section 16 of the Clayton
Act against General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE),
charging GTE with violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
and section 7 of the Clayton Act. The contention was that the ac-
quisitions49 of Leich Electric Company, Automatic Electric Com-
pany, Lenkurt Company, Inc. and Sylvania Electric Products, Inc.,
all manufacturers of telecommunications equipment, allowed GTE
to become ". . . a vertically integrated telephone company, with its
telephone operating companies buying almost all of their transmis-
sion equipment, switching systems, apparatus and other telephone
communications equipment from GTE's own manufacturing sub-
46. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone and Electronics
Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 921 (9th Cir. 1975).
47. Hearings on Trust Legislation before the House Committee of the Judiciary, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess., at 842, 649-50 (1914).
48. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone and Electronics
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1207 (D. Hawaii 1972).
49. The acquisitions mentioned here were vertical acquisitions because the acquired com-
panies were suppliers of GTE.
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sidiary."50 ITT further alleged that GTE acquisitions5 of certain
telephone operating companies and subsequent exclusive purchases
of equipment by those operating companies from GTE's manufac-
turing subsidiaries effectively foreclosed competitors from selling
telephone equipment to GTE52 ". . to the detriment of actual and
potential competition by such manufacturers."53
ITT did not seek treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton
Act54 but rather requested divestiture pursuant to section 1651 of the
Act.56 GTE denied any violation of the antitrust laws and in a coun-
terclaim requested similar relief for alleged antitrust violations by
ITT.
At the trial, GTE raised the defense that the injunctive relief
under section 16 of the Clayton Act did not permit the court to order
either directly or indirectly the divestiture of any of its subsidiaries.
In support, GTE emphasized the fact that divestiture had never
been granted in a privately litigated antitrust action brought under
section 16, 51 nor had a mandatory injunction been issued in a private
suit alleging a section 7 violation.
The district court acknowledged 8 the precedents which "... by
way of bare holding, dictum, or pronunciamento have indicated
that divestiture is not available to a private party suing under §
50. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone and Electronics
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1161 (D. Hawaii 1972).
51. The acquisitions discussed here were horizontal acquisitions because they were for-
merly small operating company competitors of GTE.
52. The Ninth Circuit succinctly stated ITT's theory for recovery as follows:
The theory of ITT's case was that GTE's acquisitions had enabled GTE to effect a
growing foreclosure of competition within the tele-communications equipment-
manufacturing industry. By statisfying the equipment demand of its operating
subsidiaries from sales by its manufacturing subsidiaries, GTE allegedly reduced
to an impermissible degree the potential sales opportunities of "independent" man-
ufacturers such as ITT.
518 F.2d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 1975).
53. 351 F. Supp. at 1161.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
56. The requested order asked for the divestiture of GTE's
. . . interests in Peninsular Telephone Company (Peninsular), the Western Utili-
ties Group, Central Iowa, Hawaiian and Northern Ohio, as well as its manufactur-
ing subsidiaries AE, Lenkurt and Sylvania, to the end that the independent tele-
phone operating companies market for telecommunications equipment (i.e., ex-
cluding the American Telephone and Telegraph System (Bell)) would be opened
to competition among all the independent telecommunications equipment manu-
facturing companies,
351 F. Supp. at 1161.
57. However, the district court noted that "[d]ivestiture was ordered in Alden-Rochelle,
Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 888, 900 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) with other injunctive provisions." 351 F. Supp. at 1204 n.133.
58. Id. at 1204.
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16."" The court proceeded to compare section 15 of the Clayton Act,
authorizing government equitable proceedings, with section 16, au-
thorizing injunctive relief for the private litigant. The court noted
that Congress made no reference in section 15 to a divestiture rem-
edy available to the Government, but it provided only for "...
prevention, restraint, prohibition and injunction."60 Nevertheless,
the legislative history6 and judicial treatment" of that section con-
firmed the availability of the divestiture remedy in a government
initiated suit. Based on its analogy to section 15 and the Govern-
ment's ability to obtain divestiture under that section, and despite
previous dicta denying the availability of divestiture to the private
litigant, the court found that even a conservative interpretation of
the section 16 language 3 must allow for the equitable remedy of
divestiture.
The district court suggested that if necessary a "negative injunc-
tion" could be phrased in such a way as to enjoin the activities of
the corporation and limit the economically feasible alternatives to
one-the desired divestiture. 4 In the district court's judgment there
did not appear to be any reason why it could not do directly what
would apparently be available through an indirect method.
59. Id. The court further pointed out that those precedents:
In so doing [holding], most have but asseverated that first, only the government
may sue for divestiture; second, an injunction restricts only future acts, consum-
mated transactions are therefore beyond the scope of § 16.
Id.
60. Id.
61. The district court observed:
The House Committee on the Judiciary officially reported Clayton § 15 to be a
reenactment of Sherman § 4. H.R. Rep. No. 627, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1914).
Section 4, although referring in terms to prevention and restraints initially has been
interpreted to permit dissolution at the suit of the U.S. by means of appropriately
worded injunction. See e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106,
188, 31 S.Ct. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663 (1911). Later dissolution was permitted directly.
United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dis-
missed, 249 U.S. 621, 39 S.Ct. 291, 63 L. Ed. 805 (1919).
Id. at 1205 n.141.
62. The district court noted further that "Although litigated decisions are scant, the U.S.
has employed § 15 directly to secure divestiture. See United States v. Reed Roller Bit Co.,
274 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Okla. 1967) (partial divestiture)." Id. at 1205 n.141.
63. The district court indicated that the portions of section 16 which were analyzed were
the phrases "threatened loss or damage" and "threatened conduct." Id. at 1207.
64. The district court cited Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) as an
example of a "negative injunction" which had the ultimate effect of a divestiture. The
injunction restrained Standard Oil from voting the stock or exercising control over its subsidi-
aries. The only reasonable alternative available to Standard was to distribute the stock held
in its subsidiaries, the effect being a divestiture of control over those subsidiaries.
65. The district court found it unreasonable to assume that Congress intended that the
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Thus, the district court held that the injunctive remedy of divesti-
ture, traditionally available to the Government, is likewise an ap-
propriate remedy for the private plaintiff.66
THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court holding that divesti-
ture was a recognized remedy in a privately litigated antitrust suit.
The court found that while its holding was based upon no estab-
lished precedent, the legislative history of section 16 of the Clayton
Act supported the finding that, ". . . Congress did not intend to
permit private divestiture suits." 7 It rejected the district court's
rationale that since a court has authority to fashion a negative in-
junctive order to accomplish divestiture indirectly, certainly it
could do so through a direct method:" ". . . injunctive relief aimed
at accomplishing divestiture 'indirectly' in a private suit is as incon-
sistent with Congressional intent as an explicit divestiture order." 9
Thus, the Ninth Circuit, although affirming in part the trial court's
decision, remanded the case for the fashioning of a remedy consis-
tent with their interpretation of section 16 of the Clayton Act.
The Ninth Circuit noted that by making such a remedy
unavailable:
. . . we do not jeopardize the district court's ability to restrain
GTE effectively from violating the antitrust laws. Injunctive reme-
dies under § 16 may be as broad as necessary to insure that
"threatened loss or damage" does not materialize or that prior
violations do not recur. . . . We are confident that the pernicious
manifestations or tendencies of an illegal vertical combination...
are susceptible to direct injunctive restraint. 0
courts engage in such "verbal calisthenics" as would be required in creating such an injunc-
tion. Id. at 1207.
66. The district court answered a final contention by GTE in stating:
There is no question that actions seeking divestiture, whether by public or private
attorneys general, are dangerous to the defending corporations, and GTE argues
that only the government should be entitled to request such relief because of its
more objective, less selfish posture. This position clearly runs counter to the
[Supreme] Court's admonition in Perma Life Mufflers, that "the purposes of the
antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an everpre-
sent threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violations of the
antitrust laws." 392 U.S. at 139, 88 S.Ct. at 1984.
351 F. Supp. at 1209.
67. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone and Electronics
Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 1975).
68. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone and Electronics
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1208 (D. Hawaii 1972).
69. 518 F.2d 913, 924 (9th Cir. 1975).
70. Id. at 924-25
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This ruling is significant because prior to ITT no court had ana-
lytically dissected the issue of a private divestiture remedy in an
antitrust suit. Although some courts had considered the availability
of divestiture in private suits, none had examined the legislative
history of section 16 of the Clayton Act and utilized its interpreta-
tion of that history as a basis for its holding. The Ninth Circuit
found the section 16 reference to injunctive relief ambiguous and
ruled that the failure of Congress to provide an explicit statutory
grant of divestiture relief within section 16 precluded the availabil-
ity of such a remedy to the private litigant.
Ninth Circuit Analysis of the Section 16 Legislative History
The district court in ITT based its decision, in part, on the failure
of congressional Committee Reports7 to expressly exclude a divesti-
ture remedy from section 16. The Ninth Circuit, however, was not
as easily dissuaded in its analysis of the legislative record.72 In at-
tempting to ascertain the legislative history of the Act the Ninth
Circuit, unlike the district court, went beyond the Committee
Reports.
The court first addressed the district court's rationale for disre-
garding the House Judiciary Committee hearings on section 16. The
district court had refused to consider GTE's presentation of evi-
dence of testimony before the Committee, stating:
. . . this court, acutely aware of the legislative process and the
many obstacles a bill must overcome and changes it must undergo
71. Section 14 [now § 16] authorizes a person, firm, or corporation or associa-
tion to sue for and have injunctive relief against threatened loss or damage by a
violation of the Antitrust laws, when and under the same conditions and principles
an injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is
granted by courts of equity under the rules governing such proceedings. Under
section 7 of the Act of July 2, 1890, a person injured in his business and property
by corporations or combinations acting in violation of the Sherman Antitrust law,
may recover loss or damage of such wrongful act. There is, however, no provision
in the existing law authorizing a person, firm, corporation, or association to enjoin
threatened loss or damage to his business or property by the commission of such
unlawful acts, and the purpose of this section is to remedy such defect in the law.
This provision is in keeping with the recommendation made by the President in his
message to Congress on the subject of trusts and monopolies.
H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1914).
72. Judge Goodwin, writing for the court, initially qualified the scope and necessity for
their reference to the legislative history as an aid in interpreting a statutory provision. Accord-
ing to the traditional view expressed by the court, analysis of a legislative record is appropri-
ate in two situations: (1) where the statutory language is ambiguous, and (2) where a literal
interpretation would thwart the overall statutory scheme and lead to an absurd result. The
Ninth Circuit characterized the divestiture issue within section 16 of the Clayton Act as
meeting the former criteria. The court found that "Section 16's reference to 'injunctive relief'
is ambiguous." 518 F.2d 913, 921 (9th Cir. 1975).
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before emerging as a law, is usually dubious of the worth of any
legislative material other than committee reports accompanying
bills.73
The Ninth Circuit admitted that greater weight is validly given
Committee Reports as opposed to lesser indicia of congressional
intent, such as floor debates.74 However, the court emphasized that
merely because greater weight is afforded Committee Reports,
statements made during congressional hearings may be considered
in interpreting congressional intent.75 The Ninth Circuit further
noted, in reference to the acceptability of legislative materials other
than Committee Reports that "the Supreme Court, far from approv-
ing the exclusion of less formal material, has repeatedly interpreted
legislation by referring to statements made in floor debates and
hearings."7"
In constructing a foundation for its ultimate holding, the Ninth
Circuit referred to several statements in the Judiciary Committee
hearings. These statements were made in reference to the allowance
of dissolution suits by the private party under section 16 of the
Clayton Act.77 The first such exchange involved a statement by
Congressman John Floyd in response to comments by Samuel Un-
termeyer, an attorney, advocating the expansion of section 16 to
include private dissolution suits. Congressman Floyd stated: "We
did not intend by section [16] to give the individual the same
power to bring a suit to dissolve the corporation that the government
has . . . .We discussed that very thoroughly among ourselves and
we decided he should not have [it]." 78 The court recognized that
73. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone and Electronics
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1207 n.150 (D. Hawaii 1972).
74. One court recently observed this approach taken by the Ninth Circuit and commented
with, what could be termed at the least, a degree of skepticism: "In their efforts to resolve
this problem, [the issue of a private divestiture remedy] the courts have entered the quag-
mire of legislative history." Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corporation, No. 74
Civ. 2945 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1975).
75. Hearings on Trust Legislation Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
76. 518 F.2d at 921, citing United States v. Auto Workers 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957).
The court cited several cases in which the Supreme Court utilized either statements made
in floor debates or in hearings. E.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 575-78 (1963);
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951). The Ninth Circuit further
stated that the district court could have looked to such statements for guidance in determin-
ing what Congress meant by the term "injunctive relief" in section 16. But see Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-96 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring), criticizing the
Court's opinion for "going beyond Committee reports, which presumably are well considered
and carefully prepared..." and relying on "casual statements from floor debates ... as a
basis for making up our minds what law Congress intended to enact .
77. House Hearings, supra note 75, at 261, 492, 649-50, 1372-73.
78. Id. at 842.
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although Congressman Floyd spoke in terms of the intent of the
Committee, his statement indicated only his opinion of the Com-
mittee's intent at the time he spoke. This becomes apparent upon
examining subsequent exchanges between the Committee members
and witnesses. In particular, the Ninth Circuit mentions an ex-
change between Congressman Charles Carlin and witness Louis D.
Brandeis.79 The exchange indicated that the Committee was consid-
ering suggestions and taking testimony regarding dissolution and
was still uncertain of the availability of that remedy to the private
litigant. The court, nevertheless, considered that the various ex-
changes and discussions revealed that the reference in the proposed
bill to injunctive relief clearly did not include at that time the
remedy of dissolution or divestiture. "The Committee viewed the
provision of private injunctive relief as allowing 'injunctive relief
only' and not actions for dissolution."80
The Ninth Circuit placed a great deal of emphasis on statements
in the Committee hearings which indicate that dissolution or divest-
iture and injunctive relief are two very distinct concepts. Therefore,
if Congress intended that section 16 allow for private divestiture, the
language of the bill would have been altered to provide for such a
remedy.8' "The inescapable conclusion is that the committee chose
to reject the proposed amendments and permit 'injunctive relief
only' ."8
ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit's opinion and analysis of the legislative history
of section 16 of the Clayton Act is exhaustive. There appears to be
little doubt that several members of the Senate and House Commit-
tees assumed section 16 did not create a private divestiture remedy.
Recently, however, courts commenting on the private divestiture
issue have questioned not the logic of the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the legislative history, but disputed (1) the strength given
statements made in Committee hearings toward determining con-
gressional intent, and (2) the wisdom of looking to such statements
and allowing them to control the contemporary application of the
Act.13 These recent decisions have intimated that the emphasis in
79. Id. at 649-50.
80. 518 F.2d at 922.
81. Samuel Untermeyer, in advocating the availability of dissolution under section 16,
proposed the following amendment: "injunctive and other equitable relief, including an ac-
tion for the dissolution of the corporation and for a receiver thereof. ... House Hearings,
supra note 75, at 843.
82. 518 F.2d at 922.
83. Judge Ward in a recent case raising the divestiture issue, noted authority on both
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analysis of the Ninth Circuit was misplaced. Their position is that
the overall policy of the antitrust laws, and not the discussions in
the House Judiciary Committee in 1914, should guide the determi-
nation of the validity of a private divestiture remedy. The inquiry
concerning the availability of divestiture to the private litigant must
be an inquiry into the interpretation of the current socio-economic
policy and purpose of the antitrust laws. 84 This policy is, and has
been, to preserve competition within markets, avoid concentration
of economic power and promote the most efficient allocation of re-
sources. With these policy considerations in mind, several concep-
tual aspects of the antitrust laws in relation to private divestiture
warrant discussion: (1) private divestiture may prove to be the only
effective relief available to insure enforcement of the economic goals
underlying the antitrust laws; (2) a court should have the authority
to undo what it might have prevented initially; and (3) divestiture
may well go further than any other remedy toward meeting the
overall purposes of the antitrust laws.
Private Divestiture: Potentially The Only Adequate Remedy
Under the rationale of ITT, section 16 allows for broad injunctive
remedies "to ensure that 'threatened loss or damage' does not ma-
terialize or that prior violations do not recur,"8 but does not allow
divestiture. From this language it might appear that the Ninth
Circuit would accept both negative and mandatory injunctive relief.
The situation is conceivable in which a violator is ordered by court
through a mandatory injunction to take affirmative steps to insure
that a threatened loss does not materialize or actual harm continue.
Such injunctions commonly issue in "refusal to deal" cases. In such
cases, the court may order the violator to deal with the plaintiff,"
in order to restablish the prior competitive state of the market. The
negative injunction, however, is traditionally utilized to enjoin or
restrain one from continuing activities which violate the antitrust
laws. Effective enforcement of the antitrust laws and policies re-
quires remedial measures which adequately protect the public and
sides. Compare the ITT case denying divestiture with NBO Industries Treadway Companies,
Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) 60,479 (3d Cir. 1975),
questioning the strength of the basis for the ITT denial, and indicating that divestiture should
be available to the private plaintiff. "Belaboring inconclusive scraps of legislative history may
be less worthwile than examining the broad aim of the statutory scheme..." Fuchs Sugars
& Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., No. 74 Civ. 2945 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 8, 1975).
84. See Comment, Private Divestiture: Antitrust's Latest Problem Child, 41 FORDHAM L.
REV. 569, 597 (1973).
85. 518 F.2d at 925.
86. See Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta, 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Greenspan v.
McCarran, 105 F. Supp. 662 (D. Nev. 1952).
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the individual competitors in the market. Negative injunctions and
the type of mandatory injunctions apparently available under ITT"
may not always be adequate antitrust remedies.
Perhaps the most telling situation exists in the case of the acquisi-
tion or merger which substantially alters the competitive structure
of the market. In NBO Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp.8 the district court, in discussing its divestiture order, indi-
cated its concern that the traditional negative injunctive relief
would not in fact remedy the imbalance in economic power caused
by the violations of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
For the Court simply to enjoin these particular methods of doing
business would not prevent the defendant from possibly creating
other means and practices by which the same anti-competitive
effects could be produced in the market. . . . This danger can
effectively be removed only by rescinding the merger.89
There would appear to be no injunctive relief available, short of
divestiture, which could actually remedy the harm done in the par-
ticular market. The relative competitive positions in the market
have been altered and the violator, absent divestiture, will retain his
illegally acquired power in the market.
The denial of divestiture eliminates the only appropriate and
effective remedy when a violation of the antitrust laws alters a mar-
ket structure. Proper and full enforcement of the laws in such a case
is not achieved. If a primary concern underlying the private remedy
is the private attorneys general concept as an enforcement aid, then
denying divestiture merely because the plaintiff is a private party
rather than the Government is incongruous." Where an acquisition
or merger has been found to be a violation of the antitrust laws and
it is determined that the remedy which will most efficiently carry
out the antitrust policy is divesting the violative acquisition, no
reason exists for denying adequate and effective enforcement by a
private attorney general.
87. Some courts have held that divestiture is a type of mandatory injunction. See, e.g.,
Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Since ITT found
divestiture unavailable, they certainly did not agree with that theory.
88. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1974 Trade Cas.) 75,399 (D.N.J. 1974).
89. Id. at 98,306-07. Although the Third Circuit reversed the lower court's divestiture
order, stating "At this late stage, ten years after the acquisition, divestiture of going, thriving
bowling centers to other purchasers will not change the competitive picture." 5 TRADE REG.
REP. 60,479 at 67,129 (3d Cir. 1975). The court made it clear that its ruling did not preclude
the divestiture remedy in general, but only in this instance.
90. While some may argue that the private litigant and the remedial policy are concerned
with the relief available to the individual, the very idea underlying the enactment of the
private remedial provisions was to motivate the private litigant to enforce the public policy.
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An ancillary argument, questioning the adequacy of injunctive
relief short of divestiture, concerns the position the plaintiff is
placed in following such an injunctive order. If the remedy is to have
any force at all, the plaintiff will be required to "police" the defen-
dant's activities. Most plaintiffs are not in a position to enforce the
injunction against the defendant every time a violation of that in-
junction is suspected. A divestiture is a final and complete remedy.
Under a divestiture order the plaintiff, to insure compliance, would
not be required to continually monitor the activities of the defen-
dant. Divestiture is a severe and drastic remedy. However, the effec-
tive enforcement of the antitrust laws and the protection of the
competitive market system require that courts order divestiture
when necessary to meet these goals."
Courts' Equity Power
In Venner v. Pennsylvania Steel Co.," the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey held that section 16 of the
Clayton Act could not reach a consummated transaction because
the language of the provision was preventive in nature. Therefore,
once the prohibited conduct had occurred, section 16 of the Act was
of no aid to the private plaintiff. This holding apparently stems
from the statutory language "threatened" loss or damage. The im-
plicit conclusion being that once the acquisition or merger has been
consummated, the loss or damage is no longer "threatened." Such
a rationale inappropriately assumes that harm or damage cannot
occur after a violator has wrongfully increased his market power. In
fact, the more threatening harm may well be that which a competi-
tor faces once a violator has completed the illegal transaction and
begins to reap the fruits of that act. 3
In ITT the Ninth Circuit appears to be taking an analogous posi-
tion. The court was prepared to grant broad injunctive relief under
section 16 to ensure against "threatened" loss, but would not allow
a remedy of divestiture to reach the consummated merger and left
the illegal transaction intact.
The concept that a court of equity can do equity prior to an illegal
transaction, but once the transaction is consummated is without
91. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968), in which the
district court had initially denied a divestiture requested by the Government, finding injunc-
tive relief short of divestiture adequate. Several years later the Supreme Court had an oppor-
tunity to examine the relief question and found injunctive relief inadequate as it had failed
to alter the defendant's monopolistic position.
92. 250 F. 292 (D.N.J. 1918).
93. See generally Peacock, Private Divestiture Suits under Section 16 of the Clayton Act,
48 TEX. L. REV. 54, 70 (1969).
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power to restore the status quo is inapposite. In fact, the Supreme
Court in Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States,9 noted in
reference to the divestiture remedy: "Like restitution it merely de-
prives the defendant of the gains from his wrongful conduct. It is
an equitable remedy designed in the public interest to undo what
could have been prevented had the defendants not outdistanced the
government in their unlawful project."95 The Chain Theatres Court
recognized the authority and power of the judiciary to act and undo
the consummated transaction. The validity of the Venner position
and subsequent decisions relying on it is doubtful."
Divestiture: A Remedy More Responsive to Antimerger Goals
There is a two pronged approach or purpose to both private reme-
dial provisions of the Clayton Act. Section 497 and section 16 of the
Act are clearly concerned with allowing the individual the ability to
defeat a violation of the antitrust laws and derive recompense for
damage caused thereby. This private interest factor is perhaps more
clearly recognized under section 4 where the private plaintiff ac-
tually receives a monetary award for damages proven. However,
section 16 certainly embodies a private interest as well. The differ-
ence is that under section 16 the individual interest is in avoiding
potential damage rather than acquiring an award for actual dam-
age. The private interest factor of these remedial provisions is the
primary stimulus for bringing suits. It is also clear that the ultimate
purpose of the private remedial provisions, protecting the public
interest, is met. 8 By motivating private parties in this manner the
public is assured of an army of private attorneys general. This in-
creases the likelihood that an antitrust violator will be discovered
and has the affect of deterring potential violators. The remarks of
Congressman Webb concerning the purpose of section 4 during the
congressional hearings on the Clayton Act highlight this concept:
Now let a businessman somewhere in the United States, or 40 or
50 of them, be damaged by the things that are denounced as un-
lawful in this section, and let them all bring suit. That . . . will
have a more deterrent effect on the men who practice those things
than mere criminal penalties. . . .'
94. 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
95. Id. at 128.
96. See, e.g., Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 157 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Fleitmann
v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co.; 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
97. See note 33 supra.
98. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
99. 51 CONG. REC. 16274 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Webb).
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In comparing section 4 and section 16 there can be little doubt
that section 4 would be more appealing to the private party who can
realize immediate rewards from a successful suit. Conversely, sec-
tion 16 would be the more beneficial remedy for the public if a
divestiture remedy were available, especially in section 7 cases
where a merger or acquisition has altered the market structure. A
successful divestiture suit under section 16 would aid the public by
restoring the market to a pre-merger or pre-acquisition point in
time. The benefit accrues to the public because of the decreased
degree of economic concentration in the pre-merger market. Thus,
the public policy underlying the antitrust laws is most effectively
implemented by a private action under section 16.
In NBO Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,' ® the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized, not committee hear-
ings, but the fundamental national economic policy of the antitrust
laws. The antitrust laws are statements of general principle and
"must be given meaning in specific applications on a case-by-case
basis."'' 1 While the Ninth Circuit was willing to determine congres-
sional intent from Judiciary Committee hearings, the Third Circuit
took the position that the antitrust laws must be given a degree of
flexibility in order to most effectively meet the underlying economic
policies. The rationale is sound. Reliance on 1914 legislative hear-
ings as the controlling factor for the application of antitrust laws
now, at a time when the complexity of economic and business condi-
tions is certainly beyond that perceived by the enacting legislators,
is unreasonable. The Third Circuit advocates an application of the
antitrust remedies which follow the overall economic policy
underlying the antitrust laws, not legislative comment. The Ninth
Circuit in the ITT case failed to consider this overall policy in deter-
mining that divestiture is not a proper remedy under section 16.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit found various colloquies between witnesses
and Congressmen concerning proposals for allowing the private liti-
gant a divestiture remedy under section 16 of the Clayton Act suffi-
cient to show congressional intent. The court, on the other hand,
failed to examine the overall policy of the antitrust laws or the aim
of the statutory scheme. A private plaintiff and the public will be
left without an effective remedy if divestiture is not allowed under
section 16 of the Clayton Act.
100. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) 60,479 (3d Cir. 1975).
101. Id. at 67,128.
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The Ninth Circuit did not consider the desirability of competitive
markets, as opposed to concentrated economic power, and the
unique ability of divestiture to restore a market to its status quo.
The remedy is necessary in those situations where traditional relief
has proven ineffective. Only by eliminating illegal market activities
can the protection sought by the antitrust laws be achieved. Only
by allowing a private divestiture remedy can realistic enforcement
to that end exist.
TODD ALLEN SMITH
